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I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District from a judgment of the District Court of Weber
County on a verdict for $59,339.00 in consolidated actions
by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, hereinafter
referred to as the "District," and the State of Utah to condemn
land for use in the construction of the enlarged Pineview
:Uam and Reservoir, a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation

·3
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Project. Separate suits were filed by the District and the State
and separate orders of immediate occupancy were taken. The
cases were consolidated only for the trial. There are some
twenty-one defendants in the District case but only the defendants C. Arnold Ferrin, Lucille N. Ferrin, Leslie Olsen and
Jessie Olsen were involved in the trial and are involved in this
appeal. The legal title to the property being condemned is in
the Ferrins and the farm is being sold under contract to the
Olsens. The State of Utah has not appealed.
Whenever the word "defendants" is used it refers only
to Leslie Olsen and Jessie Olsen, his wife. The transcript is
referred to as (R. ____ ), the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District file will be referred to as (F. ____ ), and the State case
will be referred to as (State F. ____ ).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants are the owners of 496 acres of land near
Eden, in Ogden Valley, consisting of 360 acres of mountain
range land, and 136 acres in the valley used for pasture, hay,
grain and the farmstead. Exhibit A shows the farm. The area
colored yellow, consisting of 66.8 acres, is that sought to be
taken by the District, and the green area, consisting of 5.66
acres, is that sought by the State. The land remaining is colored
red. Exhibit 2 is a photograph showing the defendants' buildings consisting of a brick home, a hired man's house, machine
shed, calf lounging shed, garage, granary, milk parlor, 2 barns,
lounging shed and catch pen. The farm had been used by the
defendants for the operation of a dairy for seven years preceding the trial. The defendants kept 48 to 50 head of cows

4
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and 12 or 15 young stock. Werner Kiepe, plaintiff's appraiser,
testified that the farm was over-improved; that if the buildings
were to burn down "they would never be replaced, because
they would not fit into a modern dairy operation with its modern buildings" (R. 255).
The defendants' valley land was in part sub-irrigated and
the higher land was irrigated from the Eden Irrigation Company system. The defendants own certificate No. 50 for 77
shares in the Eden Irrigation Company and Mr. Olsen testified
that he used about one-fourth of this irrigation water to irrigate
the land taken by the District (R. 41).
The defendants called three witnesses to testify as to
values, Mr. Olsen, D. Ray Wilkinson and Lubin A. Welker.
Wilkinson and Welker collaborated in the preparation of a
single report. Mr. Olsen testified from that report. Therefore,
the defendants' testimony as to values was taken from one
report summarized as follows:
Value of 66.8 acres taken by
District ------------------------------------$40,080.00 (R. 30)
Severance damages resulting
from taking by both State and
District -------------------------------------- 30,120.00 (R. 30)
TotaL ____________________________ $ 70,200.00
The District called as a witness, Werner Kiepe, who testified as to values and severance damages as follows:
Value of 66.8 acres taken
by District ----------------------------------$21,010.00 (R. 204)
Severance damages resulting
from taking by both the
State and District --------------------$14,430.00 (R. 251)
TotaL ____________________________ $35,440.00
'5
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The defendants' witnesses testified that the farm was
peculiarly suited for a profitable dairy operation, and that the
taking of the land by the District and the State in effect destroyed its usefulness for that purpose.

"Q. From your experience as a dairy farmer, and your
general know ledge of the industry in general, what
is the minimum number of dairy cows required to
make a profitable operation ?
A. At the present time 30 to 40 head, I would say.

Q. That would be a minimum?
A. Yes, sir" (R. 23).
Similar testimony was given by the defendants' other witnesses.
Upon cross-examination, every effort was made by the
District to find out from Mr. Olsen whether the dairy operation
was in fact profitable before the taking. He was asked to produce his income tax returns for the years 1951 to 1956 inclusive,
which he did. The returns were offered in evidence. The trial
court sustained an objection to them (R. 47). Mr. Olsen was
called by the District as an adverse witness (R. 257) and was
asked whether he had realized a net profit from the operation
of his dairy farm in 1955 (R. 259}. Objection ·was made and
overruled. He answered "I don't know." (R. 259). :Mr. Olsen
was then handed his 1955 income tax return and he was asked
to examine it and then answer the question. Objection was
made and sustained (R. 259). The following then occurred:

"Q. Do you know whether you operated the dairy
farm at a profit from 1951 to 1956, inclusive? (R.
260)
A. No, sir.

6
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MR. YOUNG: The same objection, if the Court please.
Q. You don't know?

THE COURT: The answer may stand.
Q. You don't know?

A. No, sir.
MR. SKEEN: If the Court please, I would like to go
into other matters that I'm sure counsel will object
to, and Your Honor has already indicated that you
would sustain the objections, and rather than ask
the jury to leave while I make the offer I would
like to have the privilege of making the offer after
the jury retires, and having it made part of the
record.
THE COURT: I'll be glad to retire the jury for that
purpose.
Again, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, remember the admonition of the Court. We'll call you
when we want you.
(Thereupon the jury retired from the Courtroom
and the following proceedings were had in its absence:)
Q. Mr. Olsen, what was the purchase price of your
farm in 1950? The price you paid for it?

MR. YOUNG: I make the same objection I have heretofore made.
THE COURT: Now what do you claim for this, Mr.
Skeen?
MR. SKEEN: Well, if the Court please, I have done
a little research on this matter of introducing evidence as to the purchase price of the very farm in
question, and its admissibility, and there is a dif7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ference of opinion among the Courts as to how
far back you can go, but ordinarily it is admissible
if it's not too remote. There are numerous cases
holding that a purchase within seven and a half or
eight years of the time of the taking is admissible
evidence.
THE COURT: How can that have any relation to the
value of the property at the time of the taking?
MR. SKEEN: Well, we have in the record the testimony as to increases in property values between
1950 and 1956. This land was bought in 1950 and
sold in '56, and I think it's competent evidence and
I think it's very enlightening in this case.
At any rate I'd like to make the record on it,
and if Your Honor intends to sustain the objection I'd like to make a formal offer to prove with
this witness on the stand.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection to
the question, Mr. Skeen. You may make your offer
of proof.
MR. SKEEN: Comes now the Plaintiff Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District, and offers to prove
with Mr. Olsen on the stand that he bought the
farm in litigation, including the livestock on the
farm, the farm machinery, the improvements and
all of the land, including not only the land shown
on the exhibits A and 1, but also the grazing land
referred to, for a total of $69,470.00.
That he estimated that the livestock at that time
were worth $25,000.00. That since that date-well,
the record already shows what improvements he
put on the property, and the approximate value,
since that date.
MR. YOUNG: I renew my objection, if the Court
8
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please. The danger of course is that if a man makes
a good buy he shouldn't be penalized. That doesn't
affect the fair cash market value of this property
on the day of the taking. We know of lots of instances where people have been shrewd enough to
buy property at a bargain (R. 262) .
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection."
!~he following offer of proof was made by the District
respecting the question as to whether the dairy farm was a
profitable operation before the taking.

"MR. SKEEN: Earlier in the trial the Plaintiffs offered
to prove, from the Defendant Olsen's income tax
returns, profits and losses from the year 1951 to
1956, inclusive, and gave some figures, some of
which were correct and others incorrect (R. 277).
The following are the correct figures taken from
the farm schedule of the Defendant Olsen's income
tax returns: Net profit for 1951, $41.58. Loss in
1952, $11,108.35. Loss in 1953, $4,338.28. Loss
in 1954, $3,948.71. Loss in 1955, $2,971.58. Profit
in 1956, $681.07.
THE COURT: Mr. Young, you may take your exceptions.
MR. YOUNG: I want to state in connection with that,
if the Court please, that the income tax returns
from which counsel obtained this information shows
on its face that it involves an entire complex operation of other properties, and is not a reflection
of profit and loss, even under his theory, of the
operation of the farm. It's the result which was
obtained from his combined operations as a whole"
(R. 278).
,
The trial court included among the instructions to the
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jury I'~o. 6 relating to the upsetting of the economic balance
of the dairy farm as follows:
No.6.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in
this case that the entire farm owned by defendants
constituted a unit operation, to-wit: A dairy farm; and
that the taking of a part of this farm has upset the
economic balance of the farm and thus has damaged
that part of the farm not condemned; and if you
further find from a preponderance of the evidence that
at the time of the taking by plaintiffs there was not
available comparable lands in the area of the condemned lands which could be purchased by the defendants, thereby restoring to defendants the economic
balance of said farm for the purpose to which said
farm as a unit, to-wit, a dairy farm, was being used)
and as a consequence thereof the taking of the portions
of said farm by plaintiffs has depreciated the fair
market value of the remaining property, at the time of
the taking, then you should consider these facts in arriving at the amount of severance damages to be awarded to the defendants in this case (R. 271).
The court did not define severance damage or instruct
the jury as to how to determine severance. The court refused
to give the District's requested instruction No. 5 as follows:
The property sought to be condemned, shown in
yellow on plaintiff's exhibit A, consists of only a part
of the defendants' property and leaves the defendants
the adjoining land shown on plaintiff's exhibit A. You
are instructed that you may include in the just compensation to be awarded to the defendants, the damages to the remaining Lmd caused by the severance
of the part sought to be condemned from the remaining property. The just compensation is the difference
10
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in money between the fair market value of the entire
farm land and improvements on December 12, 1956,
before the proposed taking and the amount of the
fair market value of the remaining land and improvements as of December 12, 1956, after the taking.
Your total award cannot exceed this difference. The
part of the just compensation which constitutes the
allowable severance damage is the amount left after
deducting the fair market value of the property taken
from the amount of just compensation determined
as above. This difference is the severance damage.
However, before any severance damages can be allowed, there must be evidence that there was no available comparable land in the area of the condemned
land of December 12, 1956 (State F. 41).
The verdict insofar as it relates to this appeal was as follows:
1
" W e,
the jury impanelled in the above-entitled
cause, find the issues in favor of the Defendants and
against the Plaintiffs, as follows:
1. \'\!hat was the fair cash market value of the 66.8
acres of land, together with the water located thereon
and other improvements sought to be condemned by
plaintiff Weber Basin Water Conservancy District?
(R. 281).

Answer: $33,400.00.
2. (This answer involved only the state land and
is not pertinent to this appeal.)

3. What amount, if any, do you find that the remaining portion of the premises not being condemned has
depreciated in value by reason of the taking of the
lands sought to be condemned by both plaintiffs and
the construction of the two highways across defendants'
premises?
11
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Answer: $23,109.00.
Dated: January 28, 1958.
Frank E. Little, Foreman."
Judgment was entered on the verdict.
The District filed a motion for a new trial upon the follo\""1ing grounds (R. 89) :
1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the answer
to question number 1 in the Special Verdict.

2. Errors of law at the trial consisting of

(a) The Court's refusal to admit evidence as to the
purchase price which the defendants Leslie Olsen
and Jessie Olsen agreed to pay to C. Arnold Ferrin
and Lucille Ferrin for the property sought to be
condemned.
(b) The Court's refusal to admit evidence as to profits
and losses of the defendants Leslie Olsen and Jessie
Olsen in the operation of the dairy business on
the land sought to be condemned from 1952 to
1956 inclusive as shown by Income Tax returns.
(c) The giving of instruction number 6 for the reason
that said instruction is general and contains such
undefined terms as ··economic balance of the
farm."
(d) The refusal of the court to give plaintiff, Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District, requested intruction number 5 relating to severance damages.
(e) The Court erred in failing and refusing to instruct
fully and adequately on the subject of severance
damages.

(f) The Court erred in giving instruction number 9
and particularly the first paragraph thereof, which
12
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implies that improvements as well as land were
condemned by plaintiffs.
(g) The Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' motion to
strike all of the defendants' evidence as to severance damages (R. 90).
The motion was denied.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. There is insufficient evidence to support the answer to

question No. 1 of the verdict.
2. The Court erred in refusing to admit evidence (a) to
show that the farm was not profitably operated as a dairy
farm before the taking, and (b) to show the purchase price
paid for the farm by the defendants; thereby improperly limiting cross-examination.

3. The Court erred m g1v1ng instruction No. 6, which
implies that the defendants' farm was an economic dairy unit
before the taking.
4. The Court erred in failing adequately to instruct the
jury on severance damages.
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT.

The argument under this point is directed to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to question No.
1 as follows:
What was the fair cash market value of the 66.8
acres of land together with the water located thereon

13
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and other improvements sought to be condemned by
plaintiff Weber Basin Water Conservancy District?
Answer: $33,400.00.

If $33,400.00 is divided by 66.8, the result is $500.00.
Let us examine the record to determine whether there is any
evidence to support such a figure. As indicated above, although
three witnesses testified on values there was in fact only one
appraisal made. Witnesses Wilkinson and Welker made an
appraisal report and the defendant Olsen in giving his testimony
simply read from the report. (R. 32). The report stated that
the value of the 66.8 acres taken by the District was $40,080.00,
which figures out at $600.00 per acre for all land taken.
It was brought out on cross examination of Mr. Wilkinson
that his figure of $600.00 per acre was largely based upon
unaccepted offers of land for sale. He knew of no sales of
comparable land. We quote:

"Q. Now, Mr. Wilkinson, just 'vhere did you get +-his
figure of $600.00 an acre, if you know of no comparable sales up there in that area? (R. 92).
A. Well, I didn't know of any comparable sales, but
I had a client who wanted to purchase some land
in that area and I went to a number of places, and
I have bona fide listings here of four places up
there that are offering their property for sale, and
every one of them is more than $600.00 an acre.

Q. In other words your testimony then is based upon
unaccepted offers of certain property in that area
for sale?
A. Not entirely.

Q. Well, do you know of any actual sales?
14
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A. I answered that.

Q. You don't?
A. That's right.

Q. Well, now, if you are appra1s1ng property, and
there are no comparable property sales, no accepted
offers, will you tell me again how you arrive at your
figure? (R. 99)

A. I use my own judgment.
Q. And you base that judgment upon what?

A. What I see.
Q. You don't care what the land produces?

A. Well, there used to be a time when you sold land
that way, but since the things are inflated such as
they are now why it's a difficult thing to appraise
land from that basis.

Q. So you just base your opinion then on just looking
at the land and picking a figure out of the air?
A. No. All the other information I can get from anywhere.
Q. Well, what other information did you have? That
is what I'm anxious to get.

A. Well, I had theQ. Don't go over the unaccepted offers and so on, because we have been all over that, but anything new
that you haven't mentioned that had something to
do with your judgment I'd like to hear about.
A. I think I mentioned everything.
Q. Pardon me?

15
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A. I think I have mentioned everything.

Q. You have mentioned everything you based your
opinion on?
A. That's right." (R. 100).
He testified further that in his opinion, farm lands in the
vicinity of Ogden had increased in value substantially between
1950 and 1956 and further that there had been an increase
in value because of the enlargement of Pineview Reset'voir.
He declined to say how much of the increase had been due
to this cause.
Mr. Welker gave the same testimony as to the value of
the 66.8 acres of Mr. Wilkinson. The following quotation from
the record indicates the basis for Mr. Welker's opinion of
values:

"Q. Your judgment then of $600.00 an acre was just
based on what you saw on the place, and had no
reference to comparable sales of other land in the
area; is that right? (R. 125).
A. It was my opinion as to the fair value of it.

Q. It was just based on what you saw on the ground,
is that right?
A. Well, what I saw on the ground, from my experi·
ence and my judgment.

Q. And then you'd answer definitely that it was not
based on any comparable sales ?
A. Oh, I think comparable sales entered into it a lot.

Q. With your mental operations; is that right?
A. Yes, sir (R. 126).

16
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Q. But you don't know of any land up there ever having been sold for $600.00 an acre?
A. I didn't say that.
Q. Isn't that a fact?

A. Well, I know of people that have certified a willingness to pay more than $600.00 an acre for land,
if I could get it.

Q. You don't know of any actual sales for that amount?
A. I know of offers. I know of offers that have been
made, but they were refused.
Q. But you don't know of any actual sales?
A. No, sir. They wouldn't sell. Wouldn't sell similar
land.

Q. That's been right recently, hasn't it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You know of course that there has been quite a lot
of interest in subdivision property around the new
lake, and recreational areas?
A. Yes.
Q. For speculative purposes? You know that, don't
you?

A. Yes, sir, I know that.

Q. And you know that there have been quite a few
offers to buy land that looks favorable for subdivision and recreation ?
A. I have heard there has been some."
-1

The rule is well settled that offers are inadmissible except
as admissions against the owner, Orgel on Valuation, p. 494.

1

,,

\.

1

----
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,.,.

Mr. Welker agreed with Mr. Wilkinson that the construction of the enlarged Pineview Reservoir, the improvement
for which this land was condemned, had affected his estimate
of value. On cross-examination he testified as follows (R. 116):

"Q. Mr. Welker, in fixing this figure at $600.00 per
acre, did you take into consideration the growing
scarcity of meadow land up in that area, due to the
enlargement of Pine View Reservoir?
A. I think that has affected the values.

Q. You took into consideration, did you not, in fixing
this figure of $600.00?
A. I think that would have affected the value.

Q. Well, now, do you have an estimate as to how much
it affected the value? One-third, one-fourth, or some
other amount?
A. Oh, a guess would be about one-fourth perhaps.

Q. In other words your appraisal would have been
$450.00 an acre, except for the fact that this reservoir is being enlarged; is that right?
A. Perhaps.
Q. Well, if it's right say it's right. If it's not, why
change it. I want your testimony ,and I think the
jury should have it. "Perhaps" or "I guess" doesn't
mean anything.
A. Well, let's say yes then.
Q. Pardon me?
A. Yes." (R. 117).
The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case
of United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 87 L. ed. 33 7, that
18
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an increment of value in land being condemned attributable to
the improvement for which the land is taken cannot be considered in determining value. We quote from the opinion:
"There is, however, another possible element of
market value, which is the bone of contention here.
Should the owner have the benefit of any increment
of value added to the property taken by the action
of the public authority in previously condemning adjacent land? If so, were the lands in question so situate
as to entitle respondents to the benefit of this increment ... " (87 L. ed. at page 343).
''The question then is whether the respondent's
lands were probably within the scope of the project
from the time the Government was committed to it.
If they were not, but were merely adjacent lands, the
subsequent enlargement of the project to include them
ought not to deprive the respondents of the value
added in the meantime by the proximity of the improvement. If, on the other hand, they were, the
Government ought not to pay any increase in value
arising from the known fact that the lands probably
would be condemned. The owners ought not to gain
by speculating on probable increase in value due to
the Government's activities." ( 8 7 L. ed. at page 344).
This rule has been approved and followed.
United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 93 L. ed. 1392.
Harris v. Wyandotte County, 151 Kans. 946, 101 P. 2d
898.

Annotation: 147 A.L.R. 66.
On page 68 in the American Law Report note cited
~bove the author states that the great weight of authority
denies to the owner the right to recover an increase or en19
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hancement due to the proposed improvement in the value of
the land taken.

If we take the defendants' witnesses testimony at face
value the record would not support a verdict in excess of
$450.00 per acre. Although the landowner, Mr. Olsen, testified
that the land was worth $600.00 per acre, he admitted on
cross-examination that he was simply reading from the report
prepared by his appraisers (R. 32). The following question
and answer indicate this:

"Q. Well, you have testified as to the value of the 66.8
acres as $40,080.00. Will you state whether you
have an opinion as to how that $40,080.00 was
arrived at? I mean know of your knowledge?
A. Well, I'd say no sir."
The maximum value per acre of the 66.8 acres not attributable to the Pineview enlargement, which is supported
by the evidence, is $450.00 per acre, and it is apparent from
the testimony quoted above that that figure was "picked out
of the air." This would amount to $30,060.00, or $3,340.00
less than the answer to question No. 1. It will be recalled
that Mr. Kiepe' s testimony was that the fair market value
of 66.8 acres was $21,010.00. The answer to question No. 1
in the verdict exceeded substantially the evidence before the
jury as to the value of the 66.8 acres, and the case must be
reversed for this reason alone.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE

AS TO (a) FARM OPERATION LOSSES, AND (b) THE
PURCHASE PRICE PAID BY THE OLSENS FOR THE
20
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FAR1v1 INVOLVED IN THIS SUIT, THEREBY IMPROPERLY LIMITH~G CROSS-EXAMINATION.
(a) It was the theory of the defendants that the highest
and best use of their farm was for a dairy; that because of
its location and the kinds of land of which it was comprised,
it was peculiarly adapted for that use, and that it was one of
the better dairy farms in Ogden Valley. The testimony of
the defendant, Leslie Olsen, Mr. Felt, Mr. Story, and the real
estate men-Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Welker-was all to this
effect (R. 20-23; 69, 70, 105-107, 132-135, 141-143). The
jury undoubtedly got the impression that the farm was an
excellent dairy farm, had been operated by a good farmer,
and was a profitable enterprise. The plaintiff had only one
way to meet such testimony and that was to show by the
actual records of the farm that it was not a successful dairy
farm operation. The plaintiff notified the defendants to produce their income tax returns for the entire period of their
operation of the farm. They were produced by the defendants
and as indicated above, showed that the farm was operated
as follows:
19 51
19 52
195 3
1954
19 55
1956

____________________________________________________ Profit $
41.58
____________________________________________________ Loss 11,108.35
____________________________________________________ Loss
4,338.28
____________________________________________________ Loss
3,948.71
____________________________________________________ Loss
2,971.58
____________________________________________________ Profit
681.07

Over the six years of operation the aggregate loss was
$22,366.92. In the two years when there was a profit the total
was $722.65.
The plaintiff offered the returns in evidence and the
21
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defendants' objection was sustained (R. 43-47). Later in the
trial the defendant, Leslie Olsen, was called by the plaintiff
and asked whether his operation of the dairy in 195 5 was
profitable. He answered that he did not know. He was then
handed the income tax return for that year and was asked
to examine it and then answer the question. The court sustained the defendants' objection (R. 259). This was error
because it in effect took away the plaintiff's right of crossexamination upon one of the most essential points in the case.
It has been held that in a condemnation case, evidence
as to annual crops and income is admissible for the purpose
of determining the value of farming land.
Orgel on Valuation, pp. 548, 549.
Weyer v. Chicago W & N. R. Co., 68 Wis. 180, 31 N.W.
710.
Cushing v. Pote, 128 Okla. 303, 262 P. 1070.
Stolze v. Manitowoc Terminal Co., 100 Wis. 208, 75 N.W.
987.
DeFreitas v. Suisun City, 170 Cal. 263, 149 P. 553.
Annotation: 65 A.L.R. 455.
In the Weyer case, supra, the court said:
"In estimating the value of farming land, its productiveness or the income which may be derived from
it is always considered. Indeed there is no better nor
sa fer criterion than this to get at its real value."
'fhis is a stronger case for admissibility of evidence of
profi.ts than those cited above, because here the evidence was

22
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offered on cross-examination to show that the farm was not a
balanced economic dairy unit, and clearly it was proper to
test the credibility of the defendant, Olsen, in this manner.
In 1950 Arnold Ferrin and Lucille Ferrin, his wife, sold
to Leslie Olsen and Jessie Olsen, his wife, the farm involved
in this condemnation suit. On cross-examination Mr. Olsen
was asked to state the amount of the purchase price shown
m the contract for the purpose of testing the validity of his
testimony and its credibility. The court sustained an objection
upon the ground that such testimony was incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and too remote (R. 36). Later, Mr. Kiepe
was asked to repeat what Mr. Olsen had told him about the
purchase of the farm from Ferrin. Objection was sustained
(R. 206, 207). However, Mr. Kiepe did testify that Olsen purchased the property in September, 1950 (R. 207). This was
6 years and 3 months before the "taking date," December,
1956.
The following is a quotation from 5 Nichols on Eminent
Domain, page 267:
"When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain,
the price which the owner paid for it when he acquired
it is one of the most important pieces of evidence in
determining its present value, provided the sale was
recent, and was a voluntary transaction between parties
each of whom was capable and desirous of protecting
bis own interest and no change in condition or marked
fluctuation in values has occurred since the sale. A price
paid under such conditions is a circumstance which a
prospective purchaser would seriously consider in determining what he himself should pay for the property;
as evidence before a jury it consumes little time in
23
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introduction and raises few collateral issues so that
every argument is in favor of its admissibility."
There is a great diversity in the cases as to the period
of time in which the previous sale was made, as affecting the
admissibility of evidence. Also, there is some difference of
opinion as to the purpose of the evidence. See:
Ohio Turnpike Com. v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131
N.E. 2d, 397.
Palmer v. St. Highway Com., 195 N.C. 1, 141 S.E. 338.
Epstein v. City of Denver, 293 P. 2d 308, Colo.
In the recent work entitled "Just Compensation," by
Kaltenbach, the author makes the following statement on
pages 41 and 42:
"There is no exception to the general rule with
respect to this topic. All of the cases cited in the State
Summaries hold that the general rule permits evidence
of previous sales of the condemned property to be
introduced, subject to two conditions; namely, that the
sale must have been made within a reasonable time
so that it has some bearing on the market value at the
time of the taking, and also that the sale must have
been voluntary. Subject to the foregoing conditions,
evidence of the sale of the condemned property is admissible.
The courts vary quite substantially on what is a
reasonable time. Up to eight years has generally been
considered not too remote, although one jurisdiction
did rule that seven and one-half years was too remote.
Usually anything over eight years is too remote. However, in one case, evidence of a sale made thirteen years
previous! y was permitted. In another case, the exclusion
24
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of evidence of a sale that had occurred two years previously was held not to be reversible error, although
the upper court said that the evidence should have been
admitted."
The court improperly limited the cross-examination of
the defendant, Olsen.
In State v. Peek (Utah), 265 P. 2d 630 at page 637, Mr.
Justice Wade, writing the opinion, made an excellent statement
regarding the scope of cross-examination in cases of this kind:
"There is no other instrument so well adapted to
discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and as
long as it tends to disclose the truth it should never
be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should be allowed
which an individual about to buy would feel it in his
interest to make."
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 183, Section 18.45 (2),
it is said:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The scope of the cross-examination of experts and
other witnesses who have testified to value in land
damage cases is very broad, since cross-examination is
often the only protection of the opposing party against
the unwarranted estimates that a certain class of mercenary experts is wont to indulge in. A witness may
be asked on cross-examination any facts which would
be admissible on direct examination.
A witness who has given an opinion of value may,
however, in the discretion of the court, be asked questions on cross-examination, for the purpose of testing
his opinion, which would be improper upon direct
examination.

*

*
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The opm10n of a witness may be impeached by
showing that his acts are inconsistent with his words,
as for example by showing that he has offered the
same or similar property for sale at a price far different
from what he now says it is worth, or he may be asked
whether he has not made inconsistent statements upon
the same point upon other occasions. He may be asked
what the owner paid for the property or what he has
been offered for it. Should the fact stated be material,
and should the witness, after having been afforded a
reasonable opportunity for explanation, deny the making of the statement mentioned, the fact may be proved
by other witnesses at a later stage" (emphasis added).
As stated above, the only protection the condemnor has
against "unwarranted estimates" of value is cross-examination.
A denial or limitation of that right may, and undoubtedly
often does, have serious consequences. The landowner is entitled to just compensation, but the public, represented by
the condemning agency, is entitled to place before the jury
evidence tending to show that the landowner and his experts
are making wild and exaggerated estimates. As was well stated
by Mr. Justice Wade, as long as cross-examination rrtends to
disclose the truth it should never be curtailed or limited." The
trial court ignored this important rule and left the jury with
only half the story as to value, damages and "economic balance." This was reversible error.

3. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO.6.
The full text of instruction No. 6 is given above on page
10. It will be noted that the jury was instructed that if the

taking of a part of this farm rr baJ UjlJe/ the el'01JOI!li( ba/ana
of the ft~mr'' and there is no comparable land available for re-

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

placement, "and as a consequence thereof the taking of the portions of said farm by plaintiffs has depreciated the fair market
value of the remaining property, at the time of the taking, then
you should consider these facts in arriving at the amount of
severance damages to be awarded to the defendants in this
case." The instruction implies that the farm had rr economic
balcmce" before the condemnation of part of the land. This
was clearly an invitation to the jury to award severance damages
for destruction of the dairy business which is contrary to law.
It is cleverly worded to tie such severance damages to the
remaining lands and buildings, but any jury would take the
meaning to be that if the ·'economic balance'' of the farm
is upset, and it is no longer possible to run a dairy on the farm,
substantial severance damages are in order. Emphasis was
placed on the dairy and rr economic balance" and was taken
away from the market value of the remaining lands and buildings for other purposes.
The law is well settled that damage to a business operation
ts not compensable.
18. Am. Jur., Section 259.
Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231, 65 L. ed. 238.
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 69 L. ed 644.
The instruction was especially prejudical because of the
refusal of the trial court to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine
the defendant on profits and losses to show that the dairy farm
was not a successful operation. The jury undoubtedly assumed,
as the instruction clearly implied, that the farm was an economically balanced dairy operation which was destroyed by
the taking. The result was an excessive award of severance
damages. This was reversible error.
27
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4. THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED ON SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
The court refused to give the plaintiff's requested instruction No. 5 which explains the meaning of the term "severance
damages" and properly instructs the jury on the method of
determining them. There is much testimony in the record respecting such matters as "damage to the dairy business;" "being
put out of the dairy business," and "upsetting an economic
unit" and the jury may well have considered that to be "severance damages" in the absence of a proper instruction.
The requested instruction followed closely the ruling of
this court in the case of State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.
2d 113, to the effect that the difference in market value before
and after condemnation is the proper measure of damages.
The trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury in the
regard undoubtedly contributed substantially to the excessive
verdict and justifies reversal of the case.

CONCLUSION
The insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to
question No. 1 in the verdict, the improper and highly prejudicial limitation of plaintiff's cross-examination of the defendant Olsen, and the court's error in giving and refusing
to give instructions require reversal of this case.
Respectfully submitted,

E.

J. SKEEN

NEIL R. OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for Appellant
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